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Refocusing the Dialogue
Gerhard marCeL martin
thiS eSSay is based on the lecture I gave at the annual symposium of the Eastern Buddhist Society and on the discussion with colleagues and 
the audience. This event was a further step in my engagement in Buddhist-
Christian dialogue, which dates back to 1999, when a delegation of priests 
and professors of the Ōtani tradition came to Philipps-Universität Marburg 
for discussions on the topic of “Jōdo Shinshū und Evangelische Theologie” 
and which has continued in personal exchanges and conferences at both 
places, culminating in my visiting professorship at Otani University from 
2006 to 2008. Since then I have kept in touch with Jōdo Shinshū issues.
Seishinshugi
Let me first share some of my impressions while working through the 
anthology of Shin Buddhist writings edited by Mark L. Blum and Robert F. 
Rhodes under the title, Cultivating Spirituality (originally published as An 
Anthology of Modern Shin Buddhist Writings by the Shin Buddhist Com-
prehensive Research Institute at Otani University in 2001). This collection 
of essays by Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863–1903), Soga Ryōjin 曽我量
深 (1875–1971), Kaneko Daiei 金子大栄 (1881–1976), and Yasuda Rijin 安
田理深 (1900–1982), together with the commentaries of the editors and Paul 
Watt, documents the attempt “to reinterpret Shin Buddhist teaching for the 
modern age” as it is “confronted with the rapid westernization of Japan that 
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began with the Meiji Restoration in 1868.”1 I am struck by the frontier situ-
ation and the antagonism of the powers in those days, and also by the fate 
of religion, Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian and its existential, academic, 
and institutional situation.
These priests and scholars underwent turmoil throughout their lives. They 
were first welcomed and later expelled from their academic positions and 
from the priesthood, then finally restored. Kaneko Daiei has the roughest 
biography: “forced to resign from his professorship” in 1928 and reinstated 
not earlier than 1940, “purged from the . . . faculty” after World War II in 
1949, and in 1952 he “once again resumed teaching at Ōtani University as 
emeritus professor . . . until 1974.”2
I would like to focus here on the concept behind the keyword seishinshugi 
精神主義, the term that was “given to a set of principles that prioritized per-
sonal, subjective experience as the basis for religious understanding, as well 
as the praxis that ideally brought about realization.”3 Mark L. Blum does not 
hesitate to claim that seishinshugi may be understood as the “most important 
new conception of Shin thought since Rennyo reformed Honganji in the fif-
teenth century.”4
The philosophical approach of this movement is close to the program 
which, decades later, the German (Marburg) theologian Rudolf Bultmann 
(and others) called “existential interpretation.” I note a common basis for 
both concepts: the hermeneutics of subjectivity, by which is meant the 
hermeneutics of a personal, existential approach towards traditions. Robert F. 
Rhodes maintains: “This ‘subjectivist turn,’ which locates both Amida Bud-
dha and his Pure Land in the self-awareness of the believer, is a major theme 
that underlies modern Shin Buddhist thought.”5 Kiyozawa insisted “that 
Shinran’s message on other-power was something existential rather than 
doctrinal.”6
Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin
To illustrate this emphasis I offer the following testimonies from Kiyozawa and 
Soga, which were my own starting point in the Buddhist-Christian dialogue.
1 Rhodes 2001, p. 1.
2 Ibid., pp. 164–65.
3 Blum 2011, p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 32.
5 Rhodes 2011, p. 163.
6 Blum 2011, p. 34; italics added by the author.
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One week before his death Kiyozawa Manshi dealt with “The Nature of 
My Faith” (Waga shinnen 我信念). In this essay he claimed that there is an 
essential interrelation between “the individual who believes (ki 機)” and “the 
Dharma that is believed (hō 法).” He laid stress upon the “personal experi-
ence” and the “salvific effect” of faith.7 This is the context in which the fol-
lowing must be read: “Faced with the truth of the powerlessness of my own 
efforts, I [know I] lack the ability to stand on my own, but this Tathāgata, in 
whom I am able to believe as the fundamental embodiment of the sacred, 
has the power to make me what I am.” For him, the Tathāgata is “infinite 
compassion,” “infinite wisdom,” and “infinite power.” “The Tathāgata in 
whom I believe did not wait for the next world, but brought me enormous 
happiness here and now.” And he adds: “As I have not experienced happi-
ness in the next life yet, I cannot comment on that.”8
Soga Ryōjin: “Soga breaks with earlier Shin dogma and interprets the fig-
ure of Dharmākara Bodhisattva (Hōzō Bosatsu 法蔵菩薩) as a symbol of the 
awakening of faith in human beings.”9 In critical dispute with Christian tra-
ditions concerning the mediation and the mediator of salvation he maintains: 
“As a human Buddha, Dharmākara Bodhisattva is, as such, the eternally 
existent Amida Buddha; at the same time, in another aspect, he is the true 
subject of the self that seeks salvation. I have expressed this idea with the 
words ‘the Tathāgata is none other than myself,’ and again have sensed it as 
‘the Tathāgata becomes me.’ ”10
The fates of these persons and institutions in their fundamental crisis and 
turmoil might be somehow comparable to the disaster in Germany at the 
end of World War I and to the radical changes and breakdowns in the early 
period of the Hitler dictatorship and—within a globally completely differ-
ent situation—to the worldwide civil disturbances and even riots of 1968. 
However, the student movement happened more than four decades ago, and 
sometimes I wonder where the agencies of discontent, resistance, protest, 
and creative departures can be found today. Surely, there are active ener-
gies in political, aesthetical, and religious countercultural movements, but 
there is no really effective transfer into the ruling national and international 
power structures and into the dense grids of global governance. I aim at a 
new appreciation and reinforcement of the “subjective turn” and I wonder 
7 Kiyozawa 2011, pp. 93–94.
8 Ibid., pp. 95–96.
9 Rhodes 2001, p. 3.
10 Soga 2011, p. 112.
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where and how this endeavor can be re-discovered and re-enacted in the 
interreligious dialogue.
Dialogue
To unfold my interest in the existential interpretation and in the “subjectiv-
ist turn” more broadly, I would like to offer some more general remarks 
concerning the interreligious dialogue and its dynamics. I would argue that 
subjectivity is the foundation on which dialogue has the chance to be effec-
tive and to reach deeper levels of encounter.
Any interreligious dialogue is a rather abstract and artificial endeavor if 
the participants behave as if they were expected to exchange controversial 
doctrinal positions as “officially” and objectively as possible. For in this case 
it would mean that the representatives of the religions in dialogue are sup-
posed to try to present their institutions and traditions and also themselves 
in an extremely neutral way. This means that in this process their life story, 
their personal existential attitudes towards this tradition and its various-real 
and possible-present manifestations, will be suppressed in an artificial way. 
For ordinarily, at least in modern times, men and women develop an open 
and critical, somehow nevertheless balanced attitude of identification and of 
mental and ritual distance over against the system of religion in which they 
are involved. Moreover, in strict relation to this observation: in the given 
religious institution itself one can find very different profiles in all areas of 
teaching and religious practice: doctrines, prayer, liturgy, meditation, social 
engagement. Women and men necessarily generate their own positive selec-
tion, construct new interrelations and exclude certain aspects. In their spe-
cial way of thinking, feeling, and acting they develop their own gestalt and 
a “credo specific to their personality” (persönlichkeitsspezifisches Credo), a 
term coined by the well known representative of “pastoral theology” Klaus 
Winkler.
Winkler is interested in the “embedding (integration) of the individual 
modalities of faith in psychogenetically conditioned and psychologically dis-
tinct ways of life. Character imprints and basic attitudes towards life shape 
themselves when, in consecutive phases of childhood, the individual gains 
the chance of continuously increasing his or her autonomous coping with 
life challenges.”11 According to my understanding, this conceptualization of 
development has to be extended to further stations of one’s life cycle, reach-
ing far beyond childhood with its social, political, cultural, and religious 
11 Winkler 1982, p. 161 (Author’s translation).
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parameters; and these have been highly visible in the biographies of the 
Shin Buddhist teachers mentioned above. We need to integrate these per-
sonality-specific factors also into the process and into the whole atmosphere 
of an “official” interreligious dialogue.
Purely dogmatic debates or clarifications of doctrinal positions are neither 
an adequate starting point nor an appropriate focus or target within interre-
ligious dialogues. Doctrines are the result of historical and sometimes also 
contemporary controversial theoretical religious debates in the context of 
social and ideological power conflicts within a religious organization and/or 
in confrontation with a political system. In certain periods of critical social 
development they might designate an authoritative position which is—so 
to say—“temporarily final.” However, exactly because of this, character 
doctrines are not suitable as a starting point for encounter and exchange for 
historically completely different situations. A setting of an entirely differ-
ent nature must be invented so that a fruitful encounter can take place—
an encounter that does not aim at setting up borders to define limits. So, I 
would like to raise the question: are there concepts for an effective and fruit-
ful encounter which does not end up drawing lines of partition but rather 
opens up horizons for potential exchange?
Participant Observation
Perhaps the approach of the anthropologist Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski 
can be supportive. He is often referred to as the first ethnographer who did 
his research mainly by experiencing and sharing the everyday life of his 
subjects. Malinowski developed the concept of “participant observation.” 
“To participate means to live together with another person, to adjust oneself 
to his or her culture, to stay in his or her social environment, and to speak 
his or her language—summarily: to realize a switch in perspective and to 
perceive the world with the eyes of another—at least for a certain span of 
time.”12 Michael Pye has augmented Malinowski’s program by speaking 
also of “observant participation.” In this way an even more adequate though 
risky proximity to the subject of research can be realized. In Buddhist-
Christian dialogue for example, Pye claims that scholars of religious studies 
almost become theologians, though not completely (nicht ganz), and at the 
same time almost, though not completely, become representatives of Bud-
dhism.13
12 Sundermeier 1996, p. 26 (Author’s translation).
13 Pye 2004, p. 12.
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Realizations of such a concept might include: reciprocal invitations to par-
ticipate in festivities and religious ceremonies; discussions on an intellectual 
as well as on a personal level of issues other than doctrine; and analyses of 
everyday reality, the orders of rituals, the structures of religious organiza-
tions participating in the dialogue, noting the extent of financial and institu-
tional dependencies.
Our Otani-Marburg exchange has been carried through not only by means 
of lectures and seminars but also by mutual participation in liturgical activi-
ties, not to mention all sorts of social events or more or less official aca-
demic banquets as well as “social hours” and informal “parties” (within the 
faculty as well as open to students). I would also like to mention the special 
unit of a four-hour project on “sutra-drama” which I was invited to lead, in 
which participants delved into a text of the Pure Land tradition by means of 
body-work, play on the stage, and active imagination. Personal interactions 
with colleagues in a more private setting, such as on long-distance journeys, 
sometimes extended even further by traffic jams, added to the diversity of 
impressions and information I encountered, as did talking and travelling 
together with academic colleagues, Buddhist priests, or laypersons, as well 
as with other representatives of the Japanese people.
Mirror Communication
In favor of a clearer understanding of how an interreligious dialogue might 
function and become valuable, I would like to introduce yet another model 
concerned with subjective and symbolic interaction, derived from the fields 
of depth psychology and psychology of religion. Peter Schellenbaum coined 
the term “mirror communication” (Spiegelkommunikation). Mirror com-
munication “generally aims at the perception or awareness (Wahrnehmung) 
of something which belongs to oneself, but which up to that moment had 
still been a part of one’s unconsciousness, yet was visible in a still foreign, 
external image, in order that it might finally become a mirror image.”14 Such 
“images” might be icons and all sorts of symbols, rites, myths, narratives, 
and dreams, but they also might be well-known personalities: the therapist 
as well as other people—those one admires as well as those by whom one is 
disgusted. In the process of this communication, a mutually vivid to-and-fro 
between “image” and spectator occurs. And, whilst it is a process of growing 
identity, it takes place within the tension of remaining differences—for mir-
ror images never become identical with their counterparts. Rather, they are 
14 Schellenbaum 1981, pp. 9–10.
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meant to facilitate a discovery of roles and aspects of one’s own life and ego, 
which had theretofore been known only to one’s unconscious mind and had 
thus remained inaccessible as potentials for one’s path in life. Under these 
aspects, encountering different religious traditions will not only stimulate 
and promote a new, more differentiated perception of the respective counter-
part but also contribute to a critical and positive self-perception.
The spectator never becomes identical with the “image” of the counter-
part. He does not fall into the mirror (so to say). Sundermeier offers neces-
sarily paradoxical phrases for the final results of a dialogue process: “. . . to 
be with yourself [bei sich selbst] and to be with the foreign other person 
[der Fremde] at one and the same time, to accept strangeness [Fremdheit] 
which does not eliminate familiarity and intimacy [Vertrautheit], to keep a 
distance which is proximal and includes being-together with the other.”15 
As Sundermeier writes, invoking Habermas: “Insofar as Habermas cannot 
allow the foreign to stand as foreign, does not take its context seriously, 
and drags it into his own rational, complex world of life and symbols, he 
universalizes his own context and precisely in doing that he loses any claim 
to universality.”16 From an existentialist point of view, I would like to add 
that certain manifestations of distance and strangeness will remain not only 
towards the foreign person, the stranger, but also towards my own self.
An interreligious dialogue should neither end up in reassurances and 
self-affirmations nor consist of attempts of outdoing each other based on 
the conviction that one’s own tradition is more complex, truer, or more 
healthy. Rather, dialogue could lead both to mutual enrichment as well as 
to irritating alienations or provocations. In such a dialogue I would hope to 
encounter strange or even embarrassing elements, aspects which have not yet 
been detected thoroughly enough in my own tradition and could potentially 
vitalize or deepen it. As far as Western traditions are concerned, I imagine, 
some of the crucial issues under de- and re-construction are: ego concepts, 
all sorts of ontological “traps” in terms of reification (Verdinglichung) and 
objectivations, areas of bodily and mental experiences, and expressions (not 
only “mystical” in a narrow understanding of this term).
So as a partner in encounter I will be stimulated and enriched. However, 
I cannot expect my partner in this dialogue to go through a similar process 
with the tradition he or she brings to the dialogue, nor should this be my 
aim. How he or she reacts is beyond my manipulation and control. And, in 
any case, I do not have to instruct my interlocutor on what should be learnt 
15 Sundermeier 1996, p. 132.
16 Ibid., p. 92.
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from the encounter with my tradition, and which of his or her conceptions 
and practices he or she should alter in consequence.
I would like to present an open list of activities in areas of research and 
potential exchange-areas which do not place the emphasis on verbal and 
mental/intellectual communication, but rather on experiences and perfor-
mances. Such areas are: playing, praying, meditation, and silence.
Playing
Playing is a special attitude towards the entire environment of life (Lebenswelt). 
Role playing, theater exercises, and all sorts of rituals and liturgies are 
essentially connected with bodily experiences and bodily expressions. In 
order to dive deeply and holistically into a religious tradition, it is mean-
ingful to proceed not only mentally, but also bodily. And, that means that 
all sorts of mental and bodily associations and remembrances, feelings and 
emotions, or affections come up that might have been repressed or which are 
not accessible just by studying books and by intellectual exchange.
This is the reason why, to me, liturgical training programs and the herme-
neutical approach of Biblio-drama/sutra-drama seems to be quite valuable 
and effective—also in interreligious dialogue. Here is a chance to enlarge 
and to deepen the levels of exchange. This drama work is a special mode of 
entry into the understanding of religious texts and rituals. It is an experimen-
tal, text-oriented, playful interaction within a group. It is based on physical 
body exercises and meditations, on methods derived from linguistic text-
analysis and from humanistic psychology (psycho-drama), from play, and 
theatre pedagogy.
As far as my own experience in this field is concerned, and also to 
illustrate the approach, let me mention the following.
At the “5th International Lotus Sutra Conference in Marburg” (May 
2002) I offered a theatre workshop dealing with sculpturing situations and 
encounters related in chapter 4 of the Lotus Sutra.
During my visiting professorship at Otani University (2008) I was invited 
to lead a process of “sutra-drama” dealing with the story of Ajātaśatru in the 
“Sutra on Visualization of the Buddha of Infinite Life.”17 Colleagues and 
graduate students did body work, analyzed text units, did role playing, and 
meditated at certain locations mentioned in the story (e.g., the vulture peak 
in Rājagriha, the royal palace, the Land of Utmost Bliss of Amitāyus18) and 
17 Inagaki 1994, pp. 317–50.
18 Ibid., pp. 320–21.
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stepped forth and back from one place to the other. All this was meant to 
participants to find one’s own stance within and even beyond the plot of the 
story (see Martin 2010).
In “Tenri University and Marburg University Joint Research Project: 
Prayer as Interaction” (Marburg, September 2006) we had an open liturgy 
workshop sharing cultural and religious body expressions and experiences in 
different genres or types of prayer—for example: invocation, adoration, peti-
tion, penitence, and lament (following Wittgenstein, these are quite distinct 
“language games”; see Martin 2007). For me this was an important contribu-
tion to our exchange—especially since members of Tenrikyō perform “Teo-
dori” in their services, a dance with hand movements (see Morishita 2001).
Praying and Meditation
Praying could be understood as a subdivision of play in so far as—from 
an anthropological point of view—it is a religious body exercise since it 
is related to certain bodily expressions, movements, and techniques (espe-
cially concerning heartbeat, breathing, and voicing/singing). Praying can be 
just private, but essentially it is also part of liturgies celebrated by religious 
communities. Liturgy is another wide area of body sensations and bodily 
manifestations of feelings and expressions. This focus could be a base for 
further studies on the nembutsu as well as on the mantra-like “prayer of the 
heart” in the Christian Orthodox Church.
Not only prayer but also meditation could be included under the aspect 
of bodily play. Even if the aim of certain stages of meditation is to leave the 
body entirely, the body remains the medium for reaching that aim. In such a 
process, the physical and energetic state of the body and its awareness may 
change radically.
To Be Silent and To Remain Silent
Though there is a close connection between playing, praying, and medita-
tion, praying and meditation are and remain activities in their own right and 
have their own dynamics. It also makes sense to associate both with the 
religious practice of being silent and remaining silent.
Moreover, silence is a special religious—so to say—medial or even pas-
sive activity without, below, and beyond language. That means it is a-verbal 
and trans-verbal, and as such silence is another body technique. Silence is 
a religious exercise in the everyday life and cloister liturgies of monks and 
nuns with the intention of increasing distance to the world and re-focusing 
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communication completely. Within the protestant Christian tradition, Quak-
ers celebrate long periods of a so-called “silent worship”—waiting for the 
Holy Spirit to take over, that is, to appear and to speak. Going beyond this 
realization and the usual short periods of silence during Catholic services, 
Rudolf Otto conceptualizes a “unifying silence” aiming at the “interior 
union and communication with the Presently Invisible,”19 also in the sense 
of a “mystical” human community. According to many traditions every-
thing, even words of the deity arise from “silence.”
At this pivotal point, at the very latest, we are back in academic and 
hermeneutic discourse, and here we are confronted with a paradox from 
the very beginning. Essentially mystics have to conceal something and are 
una ble to go beyond that to express their truth. According to Kaneko Daiei: 
“Words . . . are concepts and cannot express the reality that we experi-
ence directly . . . truth is inexpressible.”20 Mystics have to keep something 
secret, being quiet. However, time and again they cannot help but reveal 
their insights, which they try to communicate verbally. When dealing with 
the spiritual truth of seishinshugi there is also a certain need for arguing 
and reflection. Here lies the chance and the commitment of “existential 
theology.” Communicating verbally also means to turn back to personal 
and academic exchange and encounter by means of terms, definitions, logi-
cal—sometimes paradoxical—thinking, as well as by means of narratives 
and poetry. Poetry of all sorts, parables, hymns and other songs, kōan 公案 
and haiku 俳句, not to mention Gutoku’s Notes (Gutokushō 愚禿鈔), may be 
an even more adequate medium to communicate religious life.
Formation Programs
In 2008, I already brought up the question of “practical” training in the aca-
demic education of Shin Buddhist priests. Are there training programs to 
study the art of playing and praying, the art of performing rituals and the art 
of being and remaining silent? Or do teachers still trust in the concepts of 
“learning by doing” or “learning by imitation”—that would mean just tak-
ing over patterns of behavior from parents, teachers, and significant others? 
Admittedly, this way of learning has been and still is, in cultural history, the 
most common and effective way in all developmental stages and ways of life.
19 Otto 1923, p. 173.
20 Rhodes 2011, p. 168.
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In Conclusion
I am aware of the fact that my contribution is a rather personal statement, 
based on my special interests, experiences, and impressions in recent years 
and on my ongoing academic studies. Nevertheless, I hope that this short 
essay is not merely private, since my observations and positions arose in a 
field of ongoing academic and personal exchange. The title: “Refocusing 
the Dialogue” is meant to be a re-view as well as a pre-view: looking for-
ward, developing ideas, and opening up horizons.
reSponSeS
The Possibility of the Subjective 
Turn in Interreligious Dialogue
KadowaKi Ken
The Subjective Turn and Interreligious Dialogue
Professor Martin has stressed the nature of the subject established by 
Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin as being “a subjective turn,” or “the 
existential hermeneutics of subjectivity.” The subjectivity that these two 
established was indeed free from traditional political and religious author-
ity. This subjectivity was, however, also different from the ego of the self-
centered, imperialistic politicians of the Meiji period (1868–1912). This ego 
was a parallel of the ego that supported the independence of the Meiji state. 
It saw its mirror image in the other countries of Asia and, without engag-
ing in dialogue with these countries, attempted to assimilate them through 
violence. It was unable to recognize an other, or admit any difference in the 
mirror image it saw.
The subjectivity established by Kiyozawa and his counterparts was not 
based on that sort of political, secular plane, but instead on a transcendental 
one. They opened up this purely religious, transcendental plane by peeling 
away religious authority from the secular, political authority with which it 
had become fused. That is what is referred to as seishinshugi, “spiritualism,” 
or “cultivating spirituality.”
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On this plane of seishinshugi, subjectivity is absolutely reliant on the 
Tathāgata. Or, one could say that the ego, the center of the self, is handed 
over to the bodhisattva. That is, in this subjective turn, the subject is brought 
up from the plane of the secular to the plane of the spirit, while also becom-
ing absolutely dependent on the Absolute.
It appears that Kiyozawa’s dialogue with Western philosophy, Soga’s 
dialogue with Nichiren, and Kaneko’s dialogue with the Garland Sutra 
(Kegonkyō 華厳経) all played major roles in their respective subjective turns. 
They were able to discover both similarity and difference within the mirror 
image provided by their dialogue partners, and were therefore able to criti-
cally consider their own shinjin 信心, or “faith.”
Playing a Part and the Message Directed to Me, Alone
What we seek after in interreligious dialogue is affirmation that religions 
are religions in spite of their many differences by recognizing their com-
mon forms. Through interreligious dialogue, we confirm the common form 
of “believing in something,” despite differences in the content of that belief. 
One such form is reliance on the Absolute. That reliance can be seen within 
a variety of concrete physical expressions, such as play, prayer, and silence. 
During our visits to Germany, we did not just engage in verbal dialogue, we 
also experienced many concrete expressions of this reliance on the Absolute, 
such as standing in the solemn silence of magnificent German churches or 
participating in the ritual of receiving communion at a church in Marburg.
Also, under the guidance of Professor Martin, we experienced acting out 
the tragedy of Ajātaśatru here at Otani University. The experience of play-
ing one character in that sutra play left a very strong impression on me.
Following Director Martin’s instructions, we relaxed our bodies and 
climbed on stage. Then, we played one of the characters. I cannot say 
whether Professor Martin, who served as the director, was God or the Devil, 
but we each took on one character based on his instructions. What does it 
mean exactly, to play a specific character?
For example, when Hamlet was ordered by his father’s spirit to play the 
character of avenger, he wondered whether that spirit was the Devil. In ask-
ing “To be or not to be; that is the question,” he is questioning whether or 
not he should play that character. However, when he ultimately does take 
on the character of his father’s avenger, the problem of whether this spirit 
is the Devil or not is not resolved. He chose to follow the direction of his 
father’s spirit, even if playing that character would lead to his complete 
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destruction, just as Shinran followed Hōnen’s encouragement to say the 
nembutsu, even if it might lead to hell, or Socrates followed the god’s order 
to practice philosophy, even though it led to a death sentence. Their obedi-
ence to these orders was possible because each saw the order as directed 
solely to themselves. We each took Professor Martin’s instructions as none 
other than a “message directed to me” and played our characters in obedi-
ence to his orders.
Similarity and Difference
By playing a certain character in this sutra play, I was able to establish a 
subjectivity of “absolute obedience” based on a “message directed to me, 
alone.” That is, through this sutra play, I experienced a subjective turn. That 
was a concrete experience of a religious form that can serve as a basis for 
interreligious dialogue. Further, when each person physically acted out a 
character, the individual expressions were all original. When another person 
plays the same character, the physical expressions are necessarily different. 
However, through those differences, we were able to recognize the similar-
ity in that they were playing the same character, while also seeing the dif-
ferences as valuable expressions of originality.
Interreligious dialogue—especially one that takes each other’s physical 
expressions and daily customs as a medium—should be able to form rela-
tionships where similarity is confirmed while differences are respected even 
more.
A Few Questions about Dialogue and Faith
KiGoShi yaSuShi
It is a great honor to have this opportunity to meet again with Professor 
Martin, and I sincerely hope that it will enable us to further deepen our dia-
logue with Christian thought.
I have known Professor Martin since 1999, when we here at Otani began a 
joint research project with Marburg University. My time today is too limited 
to convey my many memories from our various collaborations or the posi-
tive results I have gained from those interactions, but bearing these in mind 
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as well, I would like to contribute my part to this symposium by discussing 
two things. The first is related to how I personally approach the issue of dia-
logue between Shin Buddhism and Christianity. I will describe an experi-
ence that occurred in the course of our exchange with Marburg University 
that affected my approach, and would like to hear your thoughts about it. 
The second is related to faith. Concerning this issue, you have pointed to 
thinkers such as Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin, and I would like to go 
in the other direction and ask a few questions about faith in Christianity.
Let us start with the aforementioned personal experience, which I had at 
the conference in 1999 and which has continued to influence me strongly to 
this very day. Since this conference was the first serious attempt at exchange 
between scholars of Shin Buddhism and Christianity, we chose to focus 
on aspects that seemed to be relatively similar in each of these respective 
faiths. The agenda was broad-ranging, including such topics as Shinran’s 
shinjin 信心, or devotion, and Luther’s faith, Amida Buddha and God, Jesus 
Christ and Dharmākara Bodhisattva, and so forth. I had previously attended 
several courses at a Christian university and therefore had some relevant 
background, but for me too, this was the first opportunity to do research in 
dialogue form, and I remember being rather tense during our exchange.
I was in charge of the subject of shinjin. My counterpart in the dialogue 
was Professor Hans Martin Barth, who discussed Luther’s sola fide, salva-
tion through faith alone. How is faith gained? Who is its subject? These and 
many other issues were on our agenda, but before we knew it, our time had 
run out and the event was over. Seeing that I was somewhat satisfied by our 
discussion but still unsure of myself in the format of dialogue, Professor 
Barth was kind enough to invite me to dinner.
The two of us went out for a meal with Professor Ōkōchi Ryōgi, who rep-
resented Otani University’s research in German literature and served as our 
interpreter. We went into a Mediterranean restaurant, and once we finished 
ordering, Professor Barth said to me, “So, before we eat, let’s continue the 
discussion.” He immediately asked, “You said that the core of Buddhist 
faith was entrusting (kie 帰依), but to what do you entrust yourself?” 
I replied, “In Buddhism, it’s entrusting oneself to the teaching.”
Professor Barth instantly asked, “What is meant by the term ‘the 
teaching’?”
I replied, “It’s the truth shown by the Buddha.”
Professor Ōkōchi provided us with an accurate and swift interpreta-
tion, but as we were nevertheless careful not to burden him too much, the 
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conversation was moving forward in very simple language. After I had 
said “truth,” Professor Barth asked another question: “What is truth?”
I was thinking about all sorts of things, but in order to be able to explain 
myself as simply as possible, I finally gave the following answer: “It’s the 
law of dependent arising.”
Then Professor Barth suddenly said something astonishing: “Kigoshi-san, 
God is the one who created that law of dependent arising.”
Both Professor Ōkōchi and I were a bit startled, and I was at a loss for 
words. And yet—maybe because I was young—I sensed that if I remained 
silent this attempt at interreligious dialogue would end in failure, so the next 
moment I replied: “It was under the law of dependent arising that God, too, 
was created.”
Professor Ōkōchi, who had appeared to be equally amazed at Professor 
Barth’s declaration, nodded in approval and cheerfully translated my words. 
For a second Professor Barth looked perplexed, and I remember how I was 
somewhat nervous that the friendly conversation before the meal might turn 
into an argument. And yet, the next moment Professor Barth extended his 
hand with a smile and said, “This discussion seems to have come to its con-
clusion. Come on, let’s eat.”
My tension was at once relieved, and my shoulders loosened up. I will 
probably never forget this event for the rest of my life. In terms of win-
ning or losing a debate, or of human tolerance, it was a complete loss on my 
part. Nevertheless, these kinds of considerations did not bother me at all. 
The only thing I felt, on seeing Professor Barth’s smile and friendly hand 
as he said that the discussion could not go any further, was that it is not so 
important whether “God created the law of dependent arising” or whether 
“God was created under the law of dependent arising.” For Buddhism, the 
wall standing in the way of dialogue with Christianity is “the existence of 
God,” and for Christianity the wall is “the non-existence of God” in Bud-
dhism. It is a totally unbridgeable chasm between the two. However, through 
this exchange with Professor Barth, I have started to think that while this 
decisive difference indeed amounts to a deep gap, actually it is of little con-
sequence. Was it the “law” that preceded God or the other way around—this 
important issue does exist, but ultimately it is nothing more than a question 
of “what came first.” It is quite possible, while leaving the chasm as it is, to 
promote spiritual dialogue with regard to the question: How should deeply 
sinful humans live their lives?
I would like to hear what Professor Martin thinks about my experience or 
these thoughts about dialogue.
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From this perspective, I would like to ask a few questions about today’s 
lecture, particularly with regard to the theme of faith. You have referred to 
the way faith was understood by Kiyozawa Manshi and Soga Ryōjin. I think 
you have observed issues that, when aiming to understand Shinran’s shinjin, 
touch right to the heart of the matter. My question, following your observa-
tions, is quite a simple one.
Shinran’s shinjin is said to be an awareness, or mind, granted through the 
Original Vow, which is based on Amida Buddha’s compassion. Shinjin con-
tains two elements: recognizing one’s deep-rooted evil, and entrusting oneself 
to Amida Buddha, who ceaselessly wishes for that individual to seek a pure 
world. Kiyozawa discovered in this awareness the birth of a new subject, 
and Soga went as far as describing that subject by saying, “The Tathāgata 
becomes me.”
Now, my question is, can a similar structure be seen in Christian faith? 
The sinless Jesus Christ took upon himself the sins of all humanity, and 
redeemed those sins by being crucified. This redemption was recognized, 
and Jesus was welcomed back into Heaven. I wonder what sort of relation-
ship exists between this chain of events and the faith of individual Christians.
More specifically, I would like to ask about the following four points:
1. How is the redemption by Jesus Christ related to the personal faith of a 
Christian?
2. What sort of new worldview does God’s forgiveness bring about for the 
Christian?
3. For the Christian, is personal faith related to the discovery of a “new 
subjectivity”? If so, what is that “subject” and how is it described?
4. Would it be unsuitable to attribute the concept of jihi 慈悲, compassion, 
to God?
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Rejoinder to the Responses
Gerhard marCeL martin
Response to Kadowaki Ken
Even though you do not pose any question as such, I would like to react 
briefly to your contribution. I appreciate that you support my general con-
cept of different media in religion (playing/praying/meditation/silence/theo-
retical reflections) and my specific idea that these different media are also 
valuable tools in interreligious dialogue. I would also like to thank you for 
amplifying and concretizing my short remarks on “sutra-drama.” Just here I 
would like to add a remark. You mention twice my “instructions” during the 
workshop and that the participants “played (their) characters in obedience 
to [my] orders.” However, in my concept of sutra-drama I would never take 
the role of “a God or the Devil” in such a workshop. The leaders of such 
workshops just make suggestions and invite participants to take over roles. 
They are not supposed to compel anybody to follow any advice. In longer, 
more advanced experiential approaches, the participants even change roles 
and try out variations. All of these are contributions to the movement of the 
sutra-drama group within the open space of the given text, and it is this that 
remains the foundation and in some sense the hidden leader of this experi-
mental work.
One final remark. I would like to confirm your summary that “Interre-
ligious dialogue . . . should be able to form relationships where similarity 
is confirmed, even while differences are respected even more.” This is a 
visionary statement for an ongoing and continually refocused dialogue!
Response to Kigoshi Yasushi
For me, the report on your talk with Hans-Martin Barth is a very moving 
testimony to an interreligious dialogue. The topic is nothing less than the 
“truth” and so therefore the fundamental conceptual question soon arises: 
Is God the creator also the creator of the “law of dependent arising” or is 
he a creature of this law? Being asked about this, I would answer as fol-
lows. In terms of doctrinal systems, completely different concepts (or even 
non-concepts) of “God” do remain in indissoluble confrontation. In this 
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respect, there is no chance for a convergence or reconciliation between East 
and West (and I dealt with that problem in my lectures at Otani University 
in 2007). But, I appreciate and confirm your insight: “It is quite possible, 
while leaving the doctrinal chasm as it is, to promote spiritual dialogue with 
regard to the question: How should deeply sinful humans live their lives?” 
Here you make a shift from purely academic controversies towards existen-
tial questions of salvation and liberation. In our ongoing dialogue however, 
I would like to change one word in your aforementioned question. Instead 
of “sinful humans” I would prefer to speak of “completely lost humans.” In 
the Buddhist-Christian dialogue I became more and more aware of a certain 
fixation of Christian traditions on the moral questions of sin, whereas in 
Buddhist teaching much stress is laid on human suffering and ignorance as 
essential features of existential disasters.
At the end of your contribution you ask the question whether there might 
be comparable processes of transformation in Jōdo Shinshū and Christian 
thought in terms of “the birth of a new subject.” By quoting and briefly 
commenting on some basic terms and sentences from the New Testament, 
I hope to answer the fundamental question which you have unfolded under 
different aspects, starting with the Christian concept of redemption through 
the crucifixion as a ritualistic sacrifice. For me, it is important to emphasize 
that this understanding of Christian salvation is but one among many other 
approaches. In the Christian understanding, salvation aims at a complex and 
complete transformation of existence, which is interrelated with all steps of 
the incarnation of Jesus: his birth, life, death and resurrection, his teaching, 
and his deeds. In any case, the interpretation of the meaning of the cross 
also has mystical and ethical connotations. One of the most comprehensive 
statements regarding the meaning of the death of Christ and the birth of a 
new subject is to be found in the letter of Paul to the Galatians, where he 
says: “I have been crucified with Christ and it is no longer I who lives but 
it is Christ who lives in me” (2: 19–20). This is at least one way to express 
“how redemption by Jesus Christ is related to the personal faith of a Chris-
tian” (your first question). The “new worldview” that “God’s forgiveness 
brings about for Christians” (your second question) is one of liberation 
and openness and is not focused any longer on any personal, self-oriented 
need for salvation. This goes together with a new ability to accept others 
and oneself and to realize compassion. Thus, the “new subject” (your third 
question) exists in the atmosphere of an all-encompassing compassion (a 
central catchword in my Otani lectures of 2008), which is situated beyond 
narrow “ego” structures.
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